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People v. Moore: Can There Be Collateral
Estoppel in the Traffic Court?
Honorable Daniel T. Gillespie*
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, an issue of ultimate
fact that has been determined by a final, valid judgment may not be
relitigated between the same parties in a future lawsuit.' "[Collat-
eral estoppel] applies 'when a party or someone in privity with a
party participates in two separate and consecutive cases arising on
different causes of action and some controlling fact or question ma-
terial to the determination of both causes has been adjudicated
against that party in the former suit by a court of competent juris-
diction.' "2 Although related to the doctrine of res judicata, collat-
eral estoppel has a more limited application, as it serves to bar
relitigating a particular issue, while the doctrine of res judicata pre-
cludes a subsequent suit involving the same claim, demand, or
cause of action.3
Until recently, the doctrine of collateral estoppel could arise in
traffic court proceedings when a motorist who had been stopped
for driving under the influence (DUI) prevailed on a petition to
rescind a summary suspension of his driver's license because the
trial court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable
grounds to believe that the motorist was DUI. Under these cir-
cumstances, the motorist could move during his criminal DUI pro-
ceeding to quash the arrest and suppress any resulting evidence on
the ground that the arresting officer lacked probable cause. In
short, the motorist could assert the doctrine of collateral estoppel
and argue that because he had prevailed at the summary suspen-
* Associate Judge, Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, Juvenile Division; B.S.
1970, John Carroll University; J.D. 1978, The John Marshall Law School.
1. People v. Borchers, 67 Ill. 2d 578, 582, 367 N.E.2d 955, 957 (1977) (quoting Ashe
v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970)); see also People v. Grayson, 58 I11. 2d 260, 263-64,
319 N.E.2d 43, 45 (1974).
2. People v. Moore, 138 I11. 2d 162, 166, 561 N.E.2d 648, 650 (1990) (quoting Hous-
ing Auth. of LaSalle County v. YMCA of Ottowa, 101 Ill. 2d 246, 252, 461 N.E.2d, 959,
961-62 (1984) (emphasis in original)). See generally 6 L. PIECZYNSKI, ILLINOIS PRAC-
TICE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 21.18, at 13 (1989).
3. Compare BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 551-52 (6th ed. 1989) (estoppel) with id. at
1305-06 (res judicata).
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sion hearing, the issue of probable cause had already been litigated
in his favor.4
This argument seems logical. However, in People v. Moore,5 the
Illinois Supreme Court held that the result of a summary suspen-
sion hearing cannot collaterally estop the litigation of the same is-
sue in a subsequent criminal DUI proceeding.6 With the decision
in Moore, the court not only resolved a conflict among the appel-
late courts, but also removed this particular application of the doc-
trine of collateral estoppel from traffic court.
This Article briefly discusses the origins of the doctrine of collat-
eral estoppel. The Article then examines the doctrine in the con-
text of several Illinois appellate court cases decided prior to the
supreme court's ruling in Moore, with emphasis on the differing
rationales of these appellate decisions. Finally, the Article dis-
cusses the holding in Moore and offers some suggestions for avoid-
ing duplicative litigation in DUI criminal proceedings.
II. ORIGINS OF THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
The doctrine of res judicata, and the related doctrine of collat-
eral estoppel, seem to have been fundamental principle of civil law
from the beginning. However, the American criminal law system
did not truly accept collateral estoppel until the early part of this
century, when the United State Supreme Court decided United
States v. Oppenheimer.7 In Oppenheimer, the Court stated:
"Where a criminal charge has been adjudicated upon by a court
having jurisdiction to hear and determine it, that adjudication,
whether it takes the form of an acquittal or conviction is final as
to the matter so adjudicated upon, and may be pleaded in bar to
any subsequent prosecutions for the same offense .... In this
respect the criminal law is in unison with that which prevails in
civil proceedings."'
While the Supreme Court in Oppenheimer clearly established the
application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel in federal criminal
law, 9 whether the doctrine applied in state criminal proceedings
4. People v. Moore, 184 Ill. App. 3d 102, 106-07, 539 N.E.2d 1380, 1382-83 (5th
Dist. 1989), rev'd, 138 Ill. 2d 162, 561 N.E.2d 648 (1990).
5. 138 Ill. 2d 162, 561 N.E.2d 648 (1990).
6. Id. at 169-70, 561 N.E.2d at 651-52.
7. 242 U.S. 85, 87-88 (1916).
8. Id. at 88 (quoting The Queen v. Miles, 24 Q.B.D. 423, 431 (Hawkins, J.)).
9. Id. at 87-88; see also United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909, 913 (1951) ("it is
much too late to suggest that this principle [collateral estoppel] is not fully applicable" in
federal criminal law).
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remained unclear. Subsequently, in Ashe v. Swenson, 10 the Court
answered this question in the affirmative. The defendant in Ashe
was charged with armed robbery in Missouri." At trial, he was
acquitted because he could not be clearly identified as one of sev-
eral masked gunmen who had robbed a poker game. 12 Six weeks
later, at a second trial for the robbery of another player in the same
game, Ashe was convicted and sentenced to thirty-five years in
jail.'3 Not surprisingly, the identification testimony at the second
trial was stronger.' 4
Ashe brought a federal habeas corpus proceeding, and after the
writ was denied by both the district and appellate courts, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.15
The Supreme Court in Ashe stated as an initial matter that col-
lateral estoppel applies to federal criminal proceedings through the
double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment to the United
States Constitution. 16 Further, the Court stated that the doctrine
applies in state criminal cases by virtue of incorporation under the
fourteenth amendment.' 7 Accordingly, the Court reversed Ashe's
conviction at the second trial. The Court also noted that collateral
estoppel must not be applied in a "technically restrictive" manner,
but "must be set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye to all
circumstances of the proceedings."' 8
In Illinois, the doctrine of collateral estoppel has been applied to
both civil and criminal cases.' 9 Additionally, one Illinois court has
applied the doctrine to bar a criminal charge of theft under state
law after the defendant had already been acquitted in federal court
on a mail fraud charge because the two charges involved the same
controlling fact.20 Thus, both federal and state criminal courts ac-
cept collateral estoppel as a viable legal doctrine.
10. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
11. Id. at 437-38.
12. Id. at 438-39.
13. Id. at 440.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 440-41.
16. Id. at 442.
17. Id. at 445-46.
18. Id. at 444.
19. People v. Williams, 59 Ill. 2d 557, 560-62, 322 N.E.2d 461, 462-63 (1975).
20. People v. Borchers, 67 Ill. 2d 587, 585-89, 367 N.E.2d 955, 959 (1977).
1991]
Loyola University Law Journal
III. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN THE TRAFFIC COURT
A. Background
Under Illinois law, a motorist who is stopped and arrested for
DUI may face both civil and criminal proceedings. 21 The civil pro-
ceeding is the hearing to rescind the summary suspension of the
offending motorist's driver's license. Under Illinois law, the Secre-
tary of State is authorized to suspend a motorist's driver's license
based upon a police officer's sworn report that (1) a blood, breath,
or urine test was requested of the motorist, and (2) the motorist
refused to take one of the required tests, or submitted to a test that
resulted in a blood alcohol level in excess of the legal limit.22
A summary suspension hearing23 is an administrative function
that takes the form of a civil court proceeding.24 At the hearing,
the defendant bears the burden of presenting a prima facie case for
rescission of the summary suspension. 25 Normally, the defendant
will raise issues such as the sufficiency of the arresting officer's
sworn report 26 and may offer evidence to rebut the charge of DUI
by presenting other test results that indicate a blood alcohol level
within the legal limit.27
The criminal DUI proceeding is separate from the summary sus-
pension hearing.28 In the criminal proceeding, the defendant may
rebut the state's evidence on the issues of probable cause and the
propriety of blood, breath, or urine tests administered in conjunc-
tion with the arrest.29
B. People v. Stice
A. Fourth District case, People v. Stice, ° was the first appellate
court decision in Illinois to address whether issues decided in a
summary suspension hearing are barred by collateral estoppel from
a subsequent criminal DUI proceeding. In Stice, the defendant
21. Johnston & Higgins, Driving Under the Influence in Illinois, 22 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
551 (1991).
22. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 11-501.1(d) (1989).
23. This proceeding is also referred to in the Article as a "rescission hearing."
24. People v. Teller, 207 Ill. App. 3d 346, 349, 565 N.E.2d 1046, 1048 (2d Dist.
1991).
25. People v. Orth, 124 Ill. 2d 326, 340, 530 N.E.2d 210, 215 (1988); People v.
Gryczkowski, 183 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 1070, 539 N.E.2d 1360, 1364 (2d Dist. 1989).
26. People v. McClain, 128 Ill. 2d 500, 504-05, 539 N.E.2d 1247, 1257-52 (1989).
27. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 11-501.2(a)(3) (1989).
28. Johnston & Higgins, supra note 21.
29. People v. Krueger, 208 Ill. App. 3d 897, 905-08, 567 N.E.2d 717, 721-24 (2d Dist.
1991).
30. 168 Ill. App. 3d 662, 523 N.E.2d 1054 (4th Dist. 1988).
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motorist was arrested on a charge of DUI. a' At the hearing to
rescind the summary suspension, the court found that the state did
not sufficiently prove that the arresting officer had probable cause
to arrest the defendant for DUI. 32 Following his successful peti-
tion to rescind the summary suspension, the defendant moved to
dismiss the criminal DUI charge. The basis for the motion was
that the state was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue
of probable cause.3 a The trial court denied the defendant's
motion. 4
On appeal, the reviewing court held that the doctrine of collat-
eral estoppel did not apply because a rescission hearing, although
conducted in court, is in reality an administrative proceeding.35
The court stated that the purpose of the hearing is to provide
prompt, post-suspension review of the summary suspension in or-
der to comply with due process requirements.3 6 The court also
noted that a rescission hearing is designed to be an expeditious pro-
ceeding that allows for evidence to be presented by means of a po-
lice officer's written report.37 The court observed that application
of the doctrine of collateral estoppel would defeat the goal of expe-
diency.38 Also, the court reasoned that the state often relies on
written reports at the summary suspension hearing. If a ruling at
such a hearing could affect the admissibility of evidence at a crimi-
nal DUI proceeding, the court reasoned, the state would be much
less willing to rely on such written reports.39
C. People v. Filitti
The Second District appellate court addressed this same issue in
People v. Filitti.4° In that case, the trial court had concluded in a
rescission hearing that the arresting officer lacked reasonable
grounds to believe that the defendant had been DUI. Therefore,
the court sustained the defendant's petition to rescind the suspen-
sion.41 Thereafter, the trial court sustained the defendant's motion
to suppress the evidence at the criminal DUI proceeding based
31. Id. at 663, 523 N.E.2d at 1054.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 664, 523 N.E.2d at 1055.
34. Id. at 663, 523 N.E.2d at 1055.
35. Id. at 664-65, 523 N.E.2d at 1055-56.
36. Id. at 664, 523 N.E.2d at 1055.
37. Id. at 664-65, 523 N.E.2d at 1055-56.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 665, 523 N.E.2d at 1056.
40. 190 Ill. App. 3d 884, 546 N.E.2d 1142 (2d Dist. 1989).
41. Id. at 885, 546 N.E.2d at 1143.
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upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel.42
On appeal, the Filitti court held that in order for the doctrine of
collateral estoppel to apply, four conditions must be met.43 Those
conditions are: (1) the issue to be precluded must be identical to
the one decided at the previous hearing; (2) the issue in question
must be a controlling question of fact in both the civil rescission
hearing and the criminal DUI proceeding; (3) a final judgment
must have been rendered in the prior rescission hearing; and (4)
the precluded party under the doctrine must have been a party or
in privity to a party in the previous litigation." Importantly, the
court also warned that collateral estoppel should be applied in
a rational, realistic manner, rather than in a hypertechnical
fashion.45
In addition to explaining when the doctrine of collateral estoppel
would apply, the Filitti court also enumerated several circum-
stances in which the doctrine will not be invoked. Those excep-
tions include: (1) the precluded party did not have a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue; (2) application of the doctrine
would cause an injustice to the precluded party; or (3) relitigation
of the issue is warranted by differences in the quality or extensive-
ness in the procedures followed in the two proceedings."
As in Stice, the Filitti court concluded that a trial court's deter-
mination at a summary suspension rescission hearing that there
was no probable cause to arrest does not preclude relitigation of
that issue in a subsequent criminal DUI proceeding.47 The court
noted that a contrary result would "effectively eviscerate the provi-
sion allowing the State to rely on the officer's official reports at a
summary suspension hearing since the State would be forced to call
its witnesses in order to prevent an adverse ruling that would jeop-
ardize the DUI prosecution. 48
In addition, the court analogized the rescission proceeding to an
implied consent hearing. In the latter context, the Illinois Supreme
Court had stated:
"A motion to suppress is directed toward determining whether
certain evidence should be admitted at trial; in many cases, sup-
pression of the evidence results in a dismissal of the charges.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 886-87, 546 N.E.2d at 1143.
44. Id. at 886, 546 N.E.2d at 1143.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 887-88, 546 N.E.2d at 1144.
48. Id. at 888, 546 N.E.2d at 1144-45.
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However, when a defendant prevails in an implied-consent hear-
ing, the decision does not effect the dismissal of the criminal
charges, it serves only to stay the suspension of his driving privi-
leges until the DUI proceedings are concluded. 49
The Filitti court also noted that the purpose of the statutory
summary suspension scheme is to protect people driving on the
highways.50 That purpose, the court observed, would not be served
by permitting rescission hearings to be used as a means of destroy-
ing the state's case in the related criminal DUI proceeding."
D. People v. Flynn
In People v. Flynn,52 the trial court in a criminal DUI proceeding
granted the defendant's motion to suppress results of a
breathalyzer test. The defendant had argued that the doctrine of
collateral estoppel precluded relitigation of an issue that was ruled
on at the defendant's rescission hearing. 3 At the hearing, the trial
court had rescinded summary suspension of the defendant's
driver's license because the officer was unable to produce a valid
license to operate the breathalyzer machine and because the evi-
dence presented at the hearing indicated that there may have been
a break in the twenty-minute observation period before the defend-
ant was given the breathalyzer.-4 In granting the defendant's mo-
tion to suppress, the criminal trial court held that since a full and
complete consideration of these matters had occurred at the rescis-
sion hearing, the state was collaterally estopped from any further
consideration of those issues at the DUI prosecution. 5
On appeal, the First District reversed, persuaded in part by the
decisions in Stice and Filitti. 6 The appellate court in Flynn noted
the supreme court's prior determination "that the issues involved
in an implied-consent hearing [are] not so similar to the underlying
criminal charge of DUI that they [become] a part of the criminal
process. ' 57 By analogy, the court determined that collateral estop-
pel does not preclude the state from offering breathalyzer test re-
49. Id. at 888, 546 N.E.2d at 1145 (quoting Koss v. Slater, 116 Ill. 2d 389, 396, 507
N.E.2d 826, 829 (1987)).
50. Id. (citing People v. Gerke, 123 Il. 2d 85, 94, 525 N.E.2d 68, 71-72 (1988)).
51. Id.
52. 197 11. App. 3d 13, 554 N.E.2d 668 (1st Dist. 1990).
53. Id. at 15, 554 N.E.2d at 669.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 15-17, 554 N.E.2d at 669-70.
57. Id. at 17, 554 N.E.2d at 670 (citing Koss v. Slater, 116 Il. 2d 389, 395, 507
N.E.2d 826, 829 (1987)).
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sults at a criminal trial for DUI, even when such results were held
inadmissible at a previous rescission hearing."
IV. PEOPLE V MOORE
A. Facts of the Case
In People v. Moore, 9 a motorist was stopped by police officers
after having made "two wide right turns onto unmarked streets."'
After noticing the odor of alcohol on Moore's breath, the officers
arrested him for DUI.6' Police requested a breathalyzer test,
which Moore provided after having consulted with counsel.62 The
test revealed a blood alcohol level of 0. 17%.63 In accordance with
the applicable Illinois statute, Moore was immediately notified of
the statutory summary suspension of his driver's license. 64
At the pursuant summary suspension hearing, the court found
that Moore's wide right turns did not give rise to probable cause
for the initial stop of the vehicle. 65 Accordingly, the court rejected
as hearsay police reports that the state had offered to prove the
results of the breathalyzer test.66 Thereafter, at his criminal DUI
trial, Moore argued that the principles of collateral estoppel barred
relitigation of the prior finding of no probable cause. 67 The trial
court agreed with Moore and sustained his motion to suppress the
breathalyzer test results as evidence in the criminal proceeding.68
B. The Appellate Court Opinion
On appeal, the Fifth District upheld the trial court's holding.
The appellate court reasoned that a summary suspension hearing is
comparable to a felony preliminary hearing. Both proceedings are
designed to be expeditious in nature. The objective of the felony
preliminary hearing, the court stated, is the prompt determination
of whether a crime was committed, and if so whether the arresting
officer had probable cause to believe that the defendant was the
58. Id.
59. 184 Il. App. 3d 102, 539 N.E.2d 1380 (5th Dist. 1989), rev'd, 138 Il. 2d 162, 561
N.E.2d 648 (1990).
60. Moore, 138 Ill. 2d at 165, 561 N.E.2d at 649.
61. Id. at 164, 561 N.E.2d at 649.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 164-65, 561 N.E.2d at 649; see also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 11-
501.1(f) (1989).
65. Moore, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 104, 539 N.E.2d at 1381.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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perpetrator of the crime.6 9 In that context, the court observed, "if
defendant files a pretrial motion to suppress evidence which is
heard and granted at the preliminary hearing, that ruling is res
judicata of the issues raised by the motion." 7 By analogy, the
court concluded that the same rationale should apply to a prior
ruling in a summary suspension hearing.
The court further observed that if the state believes that police
reports alone are inadequate to establish probable cause at the sus-
pension hearing, the state nevertheless should be barred from reliti-
gating the issue at the subsequent criminal trial under the doctrine
of collateral estoppel.7 The court reasoned that the state retains
the option to call the arresting officers or other witnesses to supple-
ment the written reports that purport to establish probable cause.
Further,
If probable cause is found at the suspension hearing, after the
officer testifies, there would be no need to file a motion to sup-
press on the basis of lack of probable cause to suppress. The evi-
dence presented at the suspension hearing may be indicative of
the strength or weakness of the State's case. The State might
decide to dismiss a DUI criminal prosecution if the [summary
suspension] hearing indicates weakness in its case or a defendant
might decide to plead guilty if the hearing suggests a strong case
for the State.72
Accordingly, the appellate court in Moore held that the finding in
the rescission hearing of no probable cause to arrest precluded the
state from relitigating the same issue in the subsequent criminal
DUI prosecution.73
C. The Illinois Supreme Court Opinion
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the reasoning un-
derlying the Fifth District opinion in Moore. Instead, the supreme
court adopted the reasoning of the appellate panels in Stice, Filitti,
and Flynn. First, the supreme court noted with approval the rea-
soning in Stice that collateral estoppel should not apply to sum-
mary suspension hearings because that would frustrate the goal of
expediency, as the state would be forced to call witnesses and gen-
erally treat the proceeding as a trial. 74 The court also embraced
69. Id. at 105-06, 539 N.E.2d at 1382.
70. Id. at 106, 539 N.E.2d at 1383 (emphasis in original).
71. Id. at 106, 539 N.E.2d at 1383.
72. Id. at 106-07, 539 N.E.2d at 1383.
73. Id. at 107, 539 N.E.2d at 1383.
74. Moore, 138 Il. 2d at 167, 561 N.E.2d at 651.
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the observation in Filitti that collateral estoppel would not apply
"when an injustice would be worked against a party or when it is
'warranted by differences in the quality or extensiveness in the pro-
cedures followed by the two courts.' "I' Additionally, the supreme
court looked to the Flynn decision, which had reasoned that a sum-
mary suspension proceeding is an administrative hearing rather
than part of the criminal process. 76 In addition to these three ap-
pellate court decisions, the supreme court also relied upon its own
decision in Koss v. Slater," in which the court had ruled that "the
summary suspension hearing is not part of the criminal process,
but is, rather, merely an administrative device that is designed to
remove impaired drivers from the road promptly. '7
The court further determined that the Illinois General Assembly
intended the summary suspension process to be swift and of lim-
ited scope. 79 That purpose would be frustrated, the court reasoned,
if the doctrine of collateral estoppel were applied. More specifi-
cally, application of the doctrine would dissuade the state from of-
fering police reports at the summary suspension hearing as
permitted by statute. As a result, the court stated, application of
the collateral estoppel doctrine would force the state to produce
the arresting officers and other witnesses at rescission hearings,
contrary to the expressed intent of the state legislature."0
The supreme court in Moore also rejected the lower court's sug-
gestion to adopt a case-by-case approach to the application of col-
lateral estoppel at criminal DUI proceedings. Moore had argued
that when the record of one's rescission proceeding reveals that the
hearing provided a full and fair disposition of a material issue, col-
lateral estoppel should preclude relitigation of that issue in the
criminal DUI proceeding. The supreme court disagreed, however,
reasoning that when an issue is resolved in a cursory fashion, the
doctrine of collateral estoppel should not be applied.8" The court
75. Id. at 168, 561 N.E.2d at 651 (citing People v. Filitti, 190 Ill. App. 3d 884, 886,
546 N.E.2d 1142, 1144 (2d Dist. 1989) (citing Collins v. St. Jude Temple No. 1, 157 Ill.
App. 3d 708, 712, 510 N.E.2d 979, 982 (1st Dist. 1987) and quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(3) (1982))).
76. Id.
77. 116 Ill. 2d 389, 507 N.E.2d 826 (1987).
78. Moore, 138 Ill. 2d at 168-69, 561 N.E.2d at 651. The court in Koss held that
indigent defendants are not entitled to the appointment of public defenders in summary
suspension hearings, citing the differences between those proceedings and criminal trials.
Koss, 116 Ill. 2d at 394-95, 507 N.E.2d 829-30.
79. Moore, 138 Ill. 2d at 169, 561 N.E.2d at 651.
80. Id. at 169, 561 N.E.2d at 651.
81. Id. at 169, 561 N.E.2d at 652.
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noted that if collateral estoppel could be applied at the criminal
DUI proceeding, the state would likely find it necessary to treat
every suspension as an integral part of the criminal trial, rather
than merely an administrative device through which the defendant
can halt the otherwise automatic suspension of his driving privi-
leges. The court predicted that the process "would seldom, if ever,
be swift" and "that law enforcement officers would be required to
testify regardless of whether the defendant had subpoenaed
them."82 Thus, for both legal and practical reasons, the supreme
court in Moore rejected the case-by-case approach adopted by the
lower courts.
V. ANALYSIS
As a practical matter, courts may avoid relitigating a motion to
suppress, after a full and complete rescission hearing in which all
the witnesses testified and were subject to cross examination, by
having both parties stipulate that the testimony in the criminal
proceeding would merely duplicate the testimony heard in the
prior summary suspension hearing. In such an instance, the judge
presiding over the criminal proceeding could simply read the tran-
script of the rescission hearing and rule on the motion to suppress.
Importantly, the judge hearing the motion could rule differently
from the judge who presided over the rescission hearing. Thus,
such a process would still fall within the holding of the supreme
court in Moore, since the doctrine of collateral estoppel would not
apply between the rescission hearing and criminal DUI proceed-
ing. In application, however, the process described above may be
difficult to implement if the criminal trial judge is the same judge
who heard the petition to rescind the summary suspension.
Perhaps another way to avoid repetitive litigation would be for
the parties to agree to conduct their rescission hearing and the mo-
tion to suppress for the criminal trial simultaneously. This would
seem to be an efficient way to avoid repetitive litigation and pro-
mote judicial economy, since both parties and the issue of burden
of proof are identical in the two proceedings.
VI. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of collateral estoppel has long been applied in civil
cases, and, more recently, in criminal cases by virtue of the double
jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment. The vitality of the doc-
82. Id. at 170, 561 N.E.2d at 652.
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trine in criminal cases was not diminished by the decision of the
Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Moore. That case does stand
for the proposition, however, that collateral estoppel will no longer
bar issues decided in a summary suspension hearing from being
relitigated in a related criminal DUI proceeding.
